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A dislike of waiting for pain, aptly termed ‘dread’, is so great that people will increase pain to avoid
delaying it. However, despite many accounts of altruistic responses to pain in others, no previous studies
have tested whether people take delay into account when attempting to ameliorate others’ pain. We
examined the impact of delay in 2 experiments where participants (total N = 130) specified the inten-
sity and delay of pain either for themselves or another person. Participants were willing to increase the
experimental pain of another participant to avoid delaying it, indicative of dread, though did so to a
lesser extent than was the case for their own pain. We observed a similar attenuation in dread when par-
ticipants chose the timing of a hypothetical painful medical treatment for a close friend or relative, but
no such attenuation when participants chose for a more distant acquaintance. A model in which altru-
ism is biased to privilege pain intensity over the dread of pain parsimoniously accounts for these find-
ings. We refer to this underestimation of others’ dread as a ‘Dread Empathy Gap’.
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In experiments most people choose to hasten,
rather than delay, inevitable pain (Badia
et al., 1966; Cook & Barnes, 1964), and will even
increase the severity of pain to avoid delaying it
(Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987; Story
et al., 2013). A preference to experience pain
sooner rather than later implies that delayed
pain is subjectively worse than immediate pain,
and therefore runs contrary to the behavioral
economic notion of delay discounting, which
posits that delayed events carry less motivational
force than immediate ones (Frederick et al.,
2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991; Rachlin
et al., 1986; Van Der Pol & Cairns, 2000). Exis-
ting theories have therefore explained choice of
sooner pain as arising from a process distinct
from delay discounting. Specifically, since antici-
pating pain is known to be aversive (Boucsein &
Wendt-Suhl, 1976; Grillon et al., 1993; Hodges &
Spielberger, 1966; Huang et al., 2017; Koyama
et al., 1998; Ploghaus et al., 1999; Richard &
Berridge, 2013), expediting pain can be seen as
minimizing an unpleasant anticipation of pain,
aptly termed dread (Berns et al., 2006;
Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Harris, 2012; Story
et al., 2013; Tanaka et al., 2014).
Despite empirical support for the existence
of dread (Berns et al., 2006), no previous stud-
ies have formally examined whether people
consider dread when evaluating others’ pain.
When offered an opportunity to relieve
others’ pain in experiments, people are highly
altruistic (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Hein
et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2005; Lloyd
et al., 2004): Experimental participants will
suffer pain for themselves to relieve pain in an
anonymous other (Batson et al., 1981; Batson
et al., 1983; Batson et al., 1988; Davis et al.,
2015; Story et al., 2015), and will even pay
more money to reduce the pain of another
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participant than to reduce their own pain by a
similar amount (Crockett et al., 2014; Crockett
et al., 2015; Crockett et al., 2017). Further-
more, people are known to mount anticipa-
tory responses to upcoming pain in others
(Caes et al., 2012). These findings suggest peo-
ple will also act to relieve others’ dread—that
is, people will choose to expedite others’ pain
when that pain is unavoidable. This has rele-
vance for situations, not uncommon in
healthcare settings, where one person (often a
doctor or nurse) controls the timing of
another’s pain. For example, a nurse adminis-
tering a painful injection might attempt to
reduce the salient waiting time by preparing
equipment before bringing the patient into
the room. If a tendency to relieve others’
dread is sufficiently strong, people should
even be willing to increase another’s pain to
mitigate delay.
On the other hand, there is good reason to
believe a priori that people might underesti-
mate the effect of dread when trying to relieve
others’ pain. People are known to be systemat-
ically inaccurate in predicting how they will
behave in emotional states different from their
current state, which has been referred to as an
empathy gap (Lowenstein, 2005; Nordgren
et al., 2011; Read & Van Leeuven, 1998). Eval-
uating others’ dread of pain theoretically
requires considering not only others’ emo-
tional state (response to pain), but also others’
future state (response to pain in the future).
In computational terms, this is a challenging
interpersonal inference problem. We there-
fore predicted people would de-emphasize
dread when deciding for others, and place
more emphasis on the intensity of pain. This
would manifest as a diminished tendency to
expedite others’ pain relative to one’s own
pain. We refer to this as a hypothesized Dread
Empathy Gap, consistent with empathy gaps
observed for other abstract aversive states,
such as the pain of social exclusion (Nordgren
et al., 2011). Although we use the term ‘empa-
thy’ in this context, we remain agnostic as to
the underlying subjective or physiological pro-
cesses, and behaviorally operationalize this
hypothesis.
Dread of Delayed Pain
In conventional economic models of inter-
temporal choice, the subjective utility, U x,dð Þ,
of an outcome of magnitude x due to be
received after delay d is described in terms of
two independent functions. Firstly, an instanta-
neous utility function, u xð Þ, governs an effect
of outcome magnitude; secondly, a discount
function, δ dð Þ, governs an effect of delay,
giving:
U x,dð Þ¼ u xð Þδ dð Þ ð1Þ
Empirically, for rewarding outcomes, discount
functions are approximately hyperbolic in
form (Ainslie, 1974, 1975; Kirby &
Marakovic, 1995; Mazur, 1987), giving:




where K is the discount rate. As shown in
Figure 1a, an outcome received immediately
d ¼ 0ð Þ would have value u xð Þ, while delayed
outcomes have lower absolute value, since the
overall discount factor, given by the term in
brackets, is less than 1 for K > 0.
As shown in Figure 1b, for a painful out-
come, u xð Þ would be negative, and hyperbolic
discounting would bring its disvalue closer to
zero. By contrast, choices to expedite pain
imply its disvalue grows with delay. This
growth in disvalue can accounted for by postu-
lating an additional effect of dread. Following
previous approaches, we formalize dread as a
cost associated with waiting for pain that is
added to the discounted value of pain itself
(Berns et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987). Thus,
the disvalue of one’s own future pain is
given by:







The first term in brackets represents conven-
tional hyperbolic discounting of pain, while the
second term represents the effect of dread. Here
dread increases with delay, under an assumption
of logarithmic time perception (Han &
Takahashi, 2012; Takahashi et al., 2008). The
parameter ρ governs how dread depends on
delay: at lower ρ, dread becomes more linear
in delay and increases more steeply with delay.
α is a scaling parameter that governs the over-
all contribution of dread. As shown in
Figure 1c, under this Hyperbolic Dread model
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the disvalue of pain increases with delay, albeit
at a decreasing rate. Here, consistent with our
previous work in this area (Story et al., 2013;
Story et al., 2020), we behaviorally operationalize
dread, without specifying an underlying process.
Dread of Others’ Delayed Pain
To consider how people evaluate delayed
pain in others, we combine effects of dread and
social discounting. Social discounting deter-
mines the utility of others’ outcomes relative
to one’s own (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones &
Rachlin, 2009; Rachlin & Jones, 2008;
Rachlin & Locey, 2011). Formally, the social
utility to person i of outcome x for person j is
given by:
U i xj
 ¼ κ u xj  ð4Þ
where 0 < κ < 1 is a social discount factor, and
u xð Þ a utility function over individual out-
comes. For painful outcomes, κ > 1 implies
that another’s pain carries more disvalue than
one’s own pain, a pattern previously observed
and referred to as hyperaltruistic (Crockett
et al., 2014; Crockett et al., 2017; Crockett
et al., 2015; Story et al., 2015). Here, we con-
sider the social discount factor, κ, as fully
encapsulating a person’s generosity towards
another person in a given context, regardless
of the causes of this behavior. (For a more
complete discussion of a behavioral approach
to social discounting of pain, the reader is
referred to our recent work in this area, Story
et al., 2020).
Taken together, Equations 3 and 4 predict
that others’ dread is taken into account as
follows:
U i xj ,d






We formalize a Dread Empathy Gap as a
diminished effect of delay when choosing on
behalf of others:
U i xj ,d






where λ is an additional factor which dimin-
ishes the contribution of delay. To test for a
Dread Empathy Gap, we conducted two exper-
iments wherein participants chose between dif-
ferent painful outcomes, while we varied the
subjective intensity, timing and recipient of
the pain.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was carried out in the labora-
tory with experiential painful outcomes. Partic-
ipants made binary choices between painful
Figure 1
Dread and Delay Discount Functions
Note. Shaded grey areas denote negative utility. A. Hyperbolic delay discounting of reward of utility u xð Þ¼ 1, with rate K,
as shown in Equation 2. Here reward has positive utility, which decreases with delay, motivating choices to speed-up
reward. B. Hyperbolic delay discounting of pain of utility u xð Þ¼1. Here utility of pain becomes less negative with delay,
motivating choices to defer pain. C. Dread of pain as shown in Equation 3: utility of pain becomes more negative with
delay, motivating choices to speed-up pain. This figure is reproduced in part from our previous work published in this
journal (Story et al., 2020).
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brief cutaneous electric shock stimuli of differ-
ent intensities, at delays of up to 29 s. In this
experiment, we measured participants’ skin
conductance responses (SCRs) to anticipated
shock and actual shock for themselves and for
the other participant.
The experiment consisted of four types of
choice presented block-wise in a
counterbalanced order (Fig. 2). In self-now-self-
later choices, participants chose between
immediate and delayed shocks for themselves.
In other-now-other-later choices one of the partic-
ipants, the ‘Decider’, chose between immedi-
ate and delayed shocks for the other
participant, the ‘Receiver.’ In other-now-self-later
choices, the Decider chose between immedi-
ate shocks for themselves and delayed shocks
for the Receiver. Finally in self-now-other-later
choices, the Decider chose between immedi-
ate shocks for the Receiver and delayed shocks
for themselves. There was no opportunity for rec-
iprocity and participants were informed of this
fact. In each condition, each choice had a 0.1
probability of being realized. Participants were
informed of this at the start of the experiment,
however the outcomes were not described in
probabilistic terms (see Discussion). In the event
of a choice being implemented, there was a
fixed intertrial interval of 30 s and the timing of
the shock varied within this interval.
We predicted that participants would be
willing to endure a more severe pain them-
selves to avoid delaying it (self-now-self-later con-
dition), and might even assign extra pain to
the Receiver to avoid delaying pain for them-
selves (other-now-self-later condition). However,
in keeping with a Dread Empathy Gap, we
predicted that the Decider would be less likely
to increase the Receiver’s pain to avoid
delaying it (other-now-other-later condition), or
to incur pain themselves to avoid delaying the
Receiver’s pain (self-now-other-later condition).
The full factorial design enabled us to test sep-
arately for the effects of the recipient of imme-
diate pain and the recipient of delayed pain
on the choice of the timing of pain. We used
Bayesian model comparison to compare how
well alternative versions of the model
described above reproduced the observed
behavior. The statistical method used instanti-
ates a Bayesian mixed effects logistic regres-
sion, in which the distribution over model
parameters at the group level serves as an
empirical prior over individual level
parameters. This approach prevents unreliable




Sixty-three healthy participants (23 males
40 females; mean age 23.6 years, s.d. = 4.6 years)
were recruited from the University College Lon-
don (UCL) Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
subject database. Experiments took place at the
Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL.
Sessions lasted 2 hr and participants were com-
pensated at a rate of GB£10 per hour. Participants
were recruited in pairs. The two participants in
each pair did not meet each other, but were
informed that they would be interacting through
the computer via an intranet link. The reason for
this was to maintain anonymity and to ensure that
choices were not influenced by characteristics of
the other participant, such as their age or
gender. Before the experiment, the partici-
pants were randomly allocated to the role of
either ‘Decider’ or ‘Receiver’, by a method
designed to reassure participants that no
deception was involved (see Supporting
Online Material).
Participant Flow and Exclusions
Of the 63 participants recruited, 54 (27 pairs,
therefore 27 Deciders) completed all parts of
the study with full datasets. In the remaining
cases, either the second participant in the pair
did not arrive, time constraints forced the
experiment to end before all blocks had been
completed, or data were saved incorrectly. Self-
now-self-later choices were available from
60 participants.
Ethics Statement
All participants gave full informed consent
before taking part in the study, and were free
to withdraw their consent at any time. After
the experiment participants were debriefed
and given the opportunity to provide feed-
back. The study procedure received approval
from the UCL Research Ethics Committee
(4418/001).
Pain Stimuli and Thresholding
Cutaneous electrical stimuli were delivered
through two silver chloride surface elec-
trodes placed approximately 3 cm apart on
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the dorsum of the hand, 1 cm distal to the
wrist, via a DS5 Digitimer (Letchworth Gar-
den City, London) constant current stimulator.
A single ‘shock’ was composed of five 10 ms
square-wave pulses at 49 ms intervals. Stimuli of
this nature are considered harmless and are fre-
quently used to study pain processing in
humans (Seymour et al., 2005; Vlaev
et al., 2009). After providing consent, partici-
pants underwent a standardized thresholding
procedure. The purpose of this procedure was
to select physical intensities of shock (voltages)
corresponding to equivalent subjective levels of
discomfort on a 10-point Visual Analogue Scale
(VAS) for each participant (see Supporting
Online Material for full details). We note that
the scale confounds pain and unpleasantness
(see Duncan et al., 1989; Miron et al., 1989;
Price et al., 1983); in this case we are primarily
interested in pain as a generic noxious stimulus.
This procedure was entirely separate from
choices made by participants regarding the
timing of shocks.
Passive Trials and Physiological Measurements
We used the package COGENT 2000
(University College London) for presentation
of choices and response acquisition. Partici-
pants first performed 10 ‘passive trials’ in
which the outcome was a 7/10 shock. Delays
of 0, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 29 s were used for the
main experiment. The 0 s delay was not sam-
pled for the passive trials; all other delays were
sampled once in a randomized order. Each
passive trial commenced with a screen detail-
ing the intensity of the shock, recipient and
delay, for example: “7/10 shock for the other
participant, delay 8 secs”. After this screen, a
countdown timer began, displayed on the
screen as a pie chart, with the segment of time
remaining decreasing each second up until
the shock outcome (see Fig. 2). Participants
were informed that the other participant
would see an identical countdown timer. Dur-
ing these trials, we recorded the skin conduc-
tance response (SCR) of the Decider from two
silver chloride surface electrodes attached to
Figure 2
Experimental Protocol for Experiment 1
Note. A In each of four possible conditions (order counterbalanced across participants) the Decider was asked to choose
between two possible combinations of intensity, delay and recipient of shock. B. Choices were selected to be realized with
a 1/10 probability, in which event participants saw a yellow warning screen followed by a countdown, C, to shock delivery,
D. All participants performed self-now-self-later choices (N = 60). Only Deciders (N = 27) performed the remaining condi-
tions. For these conditions Deciders were informed that, in the event that an outcome was chosen to count for real, the
Receiver would see the Decider’s choice, followed by an identical countdown to the shock outcome
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the tips of the first and middle fingers, on the
same hand to which the shock stimuli were
being delivered (see Supporting Material
Online).
Experimental Conditions
We presented four experimental conditions
after the passive trials, block-wise in a
counterbalanced order (Fig. 2). In the first,
termed self-now-self-later, participants chose
between immediate and delayed shocks for
themselves. Both Deciders and Receivers com-
pleted these choices. The remaining three
conditions were completed by Deciders alone.
In the second, termed other-now-other-later, the
Decider could choose between immediate and
delayed shocks for the Receiver. In the third,
termed other-now-self-later, the Decider could
choose between immediate shocks for them-
selves and delayed shocks for the Receiver.
Finally in the fourth, self-now-other-later, condi-
tion the Decider could choose between imme-
diate shocks for the Receiver and delayed
shocks for themselves. There was no opportu-
nity for reciprocity and participants were
informed of this fact. In the social conditions
the Receiver was shown the options presented
to the Decider and which option the Decider
subsequently selected.
Choice Structure
Within each condition, choices followed a
symmetrical design. Each of the four condi-
tions consisted of 108 choices per participant;
18 choices were presented at each of six
delays: 0, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 29 s. For each choice
there were two options, immediate and del-
ayed pain. In ‘adjusting immediate pain’
choices, the delayed shock was always of inten-
sity 5/10, while the intensity of the immediate
shock varied from one choice to the next,
between 1/10 and 9/10. In ‘adjusting delayed
pain’ choices, the immediate shock was always
of intensity 5/10, while the intensity of the del-
ayed shock varied from one choice to the
next, between 1/10 and 9/10. The set of
choices, shown in Table 1, was the same for all
participants; no adaptive staircasing procedure
was used. Choices were presented in a ran-
domized order. Choices in which the immedi-
ate shock was the larger were designed to
assess dread while choices in which the del-
ayed shock was the larger were designed to
assess delay discounting. Similar procedures
are widely used in the literature to estimate
various expressions of delay discounting
(e.g. Kirby et al., 1999). The aim of this choice
structure is to measure the subjective cost asso-
ciated with delay, theoretically indicated by
the point at which participants switch from
preferring the immediate option to preferring
the delayed option, or vice versa. Here, rather
than finding indifference points directly, we
used model fitting (logistic regression) to find
the dread-discounting parameters which best
accounted for each participant’s choices.
Since there was an equal number of options
in which the delayed shock was more intense,
as those where the immediate shock was more
intense, the proportion of choices at each
delay for which participants chose the delayed
shock, p(choose later), provides a measure of
preferences for the timing of pain. p(choose
later) = 0.5 indicates indifference between
immediate and delayed shocks, termed the
50% indifference line. It follows that p(choose
later) < 0.5 indicates a preference for sooner
pain and p(choose later) > 0.5 a preference for
delayed pain. In keeping with our use of logis-
tic regression, we report p(choose later), rather
than estimated indifference points, as measure
of time preference for pain; p(choose later) also
has the advantage of being independent of
assumptions about the functional form of
dread-discounting.
In some choices, which we term self-now-
other-now choices (36 in total per participant),
the shock for both participants was immediate.
Since there was an equal number of self-now-
other-now choices in which the Decider’s shock
was the more intense, as was the case for when
the Receiver’s shock was the more intense, the
proportion of these choices on which Deciders
chose a shock for the Receiver, termed p(choose
other) provides an index of altruism. While p
(choose other) = 0.5 suggests that participants
were indifferent as to the recipient of the
shocks, p(choose other) < 0.5 would imply that
participants were willing to endure more pain
to relieve even a less severe pain for the other
participant (a phenomenon termed
hyperaltruism) and finally p(choose other) > 0.5
would imply a degree of self-oriented behavior
where participants would prefer that the other
participant endure more pain to relieve a
lesser pain for themselves.
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Incentive Compatibility
In each condition, each choice had a 0.1
probability of being realized. In such an
instance a yellow warning screen was first dis-
played to both participants for 2 s, after which
the countdown timer appeared (as for the Pas-
sive Trials), followed by the occurrence of a
shock at the relevant delay. This procedure
was fully explained to participants in the
instructions, who were asked to choose know-
ing that each outcome could be played for
real. The timing of outcomes for the two par-
ticipants was synchronized via an intranet link
between the two stimulus PCs. Deciders were
informed that, in the eventuality that an out-
come was chosen to count for real, the
Receiver would see the Decider’s choice,
followed by an identical countdown to the
shock outcome. In the eventuality of a choice
being implemented, there was a fixed inter-
trial interval of 30 s and the timing of the
shock varied within this interval.
We note that this form of ‘incentive-compat-
ible’ design in which selected choices count
for real is standard in studies of reward-guided
choice, albeit with the necessary difference
that outcomes are realized within the current
experiment, rather than at the end as is cus-
tomary in reward-guided choice experiments.
This arrangement was necessary to allow for a
sufficient number of experimental trials to be
administered within a reasonable timescale. A
theoretical consideration here is that, since
outcomes were probabilistic, participants may
have discounted options according to their
probability (e.g., Estle et al., 2006; Jones &
Rachlin, 2009). Against this it is worth noting
that the probabilistic nature of the outcomes
was not displayed on screen during the pre-
sentation of choice options, and therefore was
not likely to be a salient feature informing par-
ticipants’ behavior. Furthermore, the probabil-
ity of a choice being realized was constant
across all choice options.
Modeling Analysis
We fitted alternate versions of the model
shown in Equations 3 and 5 to participants’
choices. Each model yielded an estimate of
the utility of each choice option, with utilities
transformed into probabilities of choosing
each option using a softmax function. We used
a Bayesian model-fitting routine wherein
group-level data is used to generate empirical
priors on subject-level parameter estimates
(Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012),
preventing unreliable parameter estimates at
the individual level from taking on extreme
values. This routine instantiates a Bayesian
mixed-effects logistic regression; we use a
Bayesian methodology here for better align-
ment with existing computational approaches
(Daw, 2011; the reader is referred to Young,
2018, for a discussion of mixed-effects models
in a frequentist framework). We performed
model comparison at the group level using the
integrated Bayesian Information Criterion
(BICint), which scores models based on how well
they fit the data (likelihood), while penalizing
model complexity (number of parameters). As an
additional estimate of the goodness of fit of each
model we calculated the pseudo-R2 using
McFadden’s formula. For a full description of the
method and derivation of BICint the reader is
referred to Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012;
Story et al., 2020. Model fitting was performed
using custom code in Matlab (Mathworks, Provo,
UT), available on request to the authors.
Results
Self-Now-Self-Later Choices
Choosing delayed pain on less than half of
choices at any given delay (p(choose later) < 0.5)























Note. Within each condition this set of 18 choices between
immediate and delayed pain was presented at each of six
delays: 0, 2, 4, 8, 16 and 29 seconds, that is, 108 choices
per condition.
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expense of increased pain intensity, consistent
with dread. We calculated for each subject,
using the trapezium method, the area between
the curve relating p(choose later) to delay and a
horizontal line at p(choose later) = 0.5. Such
area-under-the-curve (AUC) approaches are
commonplace in quantifying discounting for
reward (see Myerson et al., 2001). Since the
simplest method of calculating AUC is dis-
proportionally sensitive to indifference points
at long delays (Gilroy & Hantula, 2018), we
calculated AUC with delay plotted on a log
scale (Borges et al., 2016). To aid interpreta-
tion of this quantity we divided each delay by
the longest logged delay, such that AUC = 1
entails always choosing sooner pain, AUC = 0
entails indifference as to the timing of pain,
and AUC = -1 entails always deferring pain.
The mean of this area across subjects was sig-
nificantly positive (mean AUC = 0.11, 95% CI
[0.07 0.15], t(59) = 5.16, p < .001) indicating a
group level preference to expedite pain.
To further characterize an effect of dread we
fitted dread-discounting functions to partici-
pants’ data. In addition to the Hyperbolic Dread
model shown in Equation 2, we also tested a
model proposed by Loewenstein (1987), based
on exponential discounting (see Supporting
Online Material for full details). The fit of the
Hyperbolic Dread model is shown in Figure 3,
illustrating that the model provides a good fit to
the data (mean pseudo-R2=.87), but underesti-
mates choices of sooner pain at longer delays.
Closer inspection of the data revealed this dis-
crepancy was attributable to participants’ show-
ing a greater-than-expected tendency to expedite
even very low-intensity delayed pain (Fig. S1,
Supporting Material Online). To account for this
finding we tested a variant of the above model in
which the dread term scales with delay but not
with pain intensity:
U i xi ,dð Þ¼ u xið Þ1þKdþ
α
ρ
log 1þρdð Þ ð7Þ
Consistent with previous findings using a simi-
lar experimental design (Story et al., 2020),
this ‘Unscaled’ variant showed better corre-
spondence to the data (mean pseudo-R2 =
.90; ΔBICint = 190) compared with Hyper-
bolic Dread), and also outperformed an expo-
nential model of dread (ΔBICint = 211). The
difference between models is not attributable
to the shape of the utility function over pain
intensity, since it survives whether this func-
tion is concave, linear or convex. Both scaled
and unscaled versions of the Hyperbolic
Dread model have four free parameters:
dread-discounting parameters α,ρ,K , and a
softmax inverse temperature parameter, β,
which governs the degree of randomness in
choices.
Decreased Tendency to Expedite Pain when Choos-
ing for Others
We tested the extent to which participants
were altruistic, and incorporated dread when
choosing for others by plotting p(choose later)
against delay for Deciders (N = 27) across the
four experimental conditions, shown in
Figure 4a. For other-now-self-later and self-now-
other-later conditions, the curves were shifted in
the vertical axis due to altruistic behavior.
For these conditions AUC was calculated rel-
ative to p(choose other) at delay zero, to correct
for the degree of social discounting. In sup-
port of a self–other difference in dread, two-
way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of the
recipient of delayed pain on AUC (F
(1,26) = 4.53, p = .043, partial η2= 0.148),
with no significant effect of the recipient of
immediate pain (F(1,26) = 2.33, p = .139, par-
tial η2 = 0.082) and no significant interaction
(F(1,26) = 2.69, p = .113, partial η2 = 0.094)
(Figs. 4a and 4b).
Mean AUC was positive across both self-now-
self-later and other-now-other-later conditions, con-
sistent with a preference for sooner pain for
both self and other, although this did not
reach statistical significance for the other-now-
other-later condition (Fig. 4b, self-now-self-later
mean AUC = 0.11, 95% CI [0.04 0.18], one
tailed t(26) = 3.18, p = .004; other-now-other-
later mean AUC = 0.052, 95% CI [-0.01 0.12],
one tailed t(26) = 1.61, p = .12). There was a
strong and significant correlation between the
tendency to expedite pain for self and others
(AUC self-now-self-later vs. AUC other-now-other-
later, Spearman ρ=0.81, p < .001), suggesting
participants used their own preferences to
guide choices about others. Preference for
sooner pain was significantly greater in the self-
now-self-later condition than in the other-now-
other-later condition (AUC self-now-self-later –
AUC other-now-other-later: t(26) = 3.39,
p = .002), although the difference between
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other-now-self-later and self-now-other-later was not
significant (t(26) = 0.38, p = .710).
Taken together, the above results indicate
participants displayed significantly lower
dread when choosing pain on behalf of
others compared with when choosing pain
for themselves. A possible explanation for
the null comparison in other-now-self-later and
self-now-other-later conditions is that these
entail a greater degree of complexity, requir-
ing participants to consider pain intensity,
delay and recipient. Participants’ choices
might therefore have been noisier in these
two conditions, tending to diminish the
detectability of dread effects and obscuring
self–other differences.
Delay is Underweighted when Choosing for Others
We went on to test the Dread Empathy
Gap model (shown in Eq. 6). This model
accounts for a reduced contribution of dread
when evaluating others’ pain by means of an
additional discount factor, λ, which dimin-
ishes the contribution of delay information
when processing others’ pain. Model fitting
further allowed us to test the possibility that
participants’ choices were noisier when
required to trade-off their pain with that of
another, by allowing the softmax inverse tem-
perature, , to be diminished by a factor
0 <ω < 1 in self-now-other-later and other-now-self-
later conditions. To fit these models, we car-
ried forward each participant’s parameters
from fitting self-now-self-later choices (α,ρ,K ,β),
and freely fitted λ,ω and the social discount
factor κ. Thus we fitted 324 choices across
three conditions (other-now-other-later, self-now-
other-later and other-now-self-later) with an addi-
tional three parameters.
The Dread Empathy Gap model provided a
parsimonious fit to the data (mean pseudo-
R2=0.75, and outperformed a Null model in
which λ¼ 1 (ΔBICint=340. Mean λ was signifi-
cantly below 1 (mean log λ¼0:86, 95% CI
Figure 3
Preference for Sooner Pain in the Self-Now-Self-Later Condition in Experiment 1
 
Note. Observed mean probability of choosing the delayed shock option (solid green circles) is plotted against the delay to
shock (in seconds) for all participants in Experiment 1 (N = 60). p(choose later) was calculated for each participant at each
delay; the group means of these participant-level estimates are displayed here. Error bars represent one standard error
above and below the group mean. Overlaid are the equivalent probabilities derived from the maximum a posteriori
(MAP) policies of alternative models of dread-discounting: Exponential Dread (hollow circles), Hyperbolic Dread (hol-
low squares) and Nonscaled Hyperbolic Dread (solid gray triangles). A horizontal line at p = .5 represents indifference
between immediate and delayed pain; choosing delayed pain less than half the time (points below p = .5) indicates a
preference for immediate pain.
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[-1.52 -0.20], one tailed t(26) = -2.68,
p = .013), supporting a downweighting of
delay information relative to pain intensity
when evaluating others’ pain. The full model
outperformed a restricted variant in which
there was zero effect of delay when evaluating
others’ pain (i.e., λ¼ 0). Taken together, these
results suggest that participants displayed
choices consistent with dread when evaluating
others’ pain, though to a lesser extent than
when evaluating their own pain. The full
model also outperformed a restricted variant
without modulation of choice noise, that is, in
which ω¼ 1 (ΔBICint > 1000). The fit of the
Dread Empathy Gap model to data from all
four choice conditions is shown in Figure 4a.
Choices that required the Decider to trade-
off their own pain with that of the Receiver
(other-now-self-later and self-now-other-later condi-
tions) allowed us to estimate the social
Figure 4
Social Modulation of Dread in Experiment 1
Note. A. Mean probability across Deciders (N = 27) of choosing delayed pain at each delay in each condition, overlaid
with behavioral policies of the Dread Empathy Gap model, fitted jointly to all four conditions. Error bars show one stan-
dard error above and below the mean. B. Mean AUC in the four conditions. Positive AUC indicates preference for
sooner pain, consistent with dread. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. C. Estimates of λ in log space. Nega-
tive values indicate underweighting of delay when choosing for others. The solid blue bar indicates the group mean; the
bright green bar indicates the 95% CI. Black dots show the parameter estimates for individual subjects, with error bars
indicating the uncertainty (square root of the second moment around each parameter)
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discount factor, κ, when fitting the above
models. Mean κ = 1.19 (95% CI [0.93 1.52]),
indicating a trend towards hyperaltruistic
behavior at the group level.
No Significant Relationship between Dread and
Altruism
We also tested for a correlation between
dread and altruism, by entering the dread-
discounting parameters K ,α and 1=ρ, derived
from fitting self-now-self-later choices, together
in a weighted least-squares analysis with
the social discount factor κ as the dependent
variable, weighted by the posterior precision
on κ. None of the three parameters emerged
as a significant positive predictor (βK=-0.00,
p=.628; βρ=-0.37,p=.66; βα=-0.04, p=.627).
Physiological Data
Of the 27 participants designated as
Deciders, skin conductance data were col-
lected from 21 out of the 27. Physiological
data from the remaining six Deciders were not
obtained due to time constraints. Skin conduc-
tance data from two of the 21 were unsuitable
for analysis, in one case due to movement arte-
facts and in another due to hyperhidrosis,
resulting in a small number of complete
datasets for this analysis (N = 19).
We compared filtered and Z-scored con-
ductance data against zero in one-sample
tests with two event regressors, an epoch
corresponding to the anticipatory period,
and a stick function corresponding to the
onset of pain. Raw data are shown in
Figure S2 (Supporting Material Online). We
found significant group-level responses to
receiving a shock oneself (shock-self t
(18) = 3.01, 95% CI [0.37 2.10], p = .008).
However, surprisingly there was no signifi-
cant conductance response at the group level
to either the anticipation of shocks for one-
self (anticipation-self t(18) = 0.83, 95% CI
[-0.02 0.04], p = .415), anticipation of shocks
for the other participant (anticipation-other t
(18) = 0.13, 95% CI [-0.01 0.01], p = .895)
or administration of shocks to the other par-
ticipant (shock-other t(18) = 0.65, 95% CI
[-0.14 0.26], p = .523).
Experiment 2
In summary, in Experiment 1 we found par-
ticipants were significantly more likely to
Figure 5
Effect of Dread when Choosing for Others Depends on Social Distance
Note. A Observed mean probability in Experiment 2 (N = 70) of choosing the delayed painful treatment option versus
delay for self-now-self-later (grey circles), other-now-other-later at social distance #1 (dark blue circles) and other-now-other-later
at social distance #50 (light blue circles) conditions. Overlaid (solid lines) are the maximum a posteriori fits of the Dread
Empathy Gap model. Error bars show one standard error above and below the mean. B. Mean AUC (log delays) in the
three conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Positive values of AUC indicate a group-level preference
for sooner pain, consistent with dread
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expedite pain when they chose the timing of
painful shock stimuli for themselves, rather
than on behalf of another participant. This
finding is consistent with our prediction of a
Dread Empathy Gap.
Experiment 1 was carried out in a labora-
tory setting, with delays on the order of sec-
onds, arguably a rather rarefied scenario. The
aim of Experiment 2 (N = 70) was to test
whether the effects seen in Experiment 1 mani-
fest also in a more naturalistic situation, with
more substantive painful outcomes over lon-
ger delays. Experiment 2 consisted of a direct
replication of the self-now-self-later and other-
now-other-later conditions, with outcomes of a
hypothetical painful medical treatment over
delays of up to 1 year.
In Experiment 2 we also examine how
downweighting of others’ dread depends on
social distance. We formalized the social dis-
tance of the other by asking people to create
an imaginary rank ordering of the people clos-
est to them in the world, starting with their
dearest friend or relative at position #1 and
ending with a mere acquaintance at #100
(Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Jones & Rachlin, 2009;
Rachlin & Jones, 2008). We sampled two
points along this continuum. Participants
made other-now-other-later choices either on
behalf of either their closest friend or relative
(social distance #1) or on behalf of a person
at social distance #50.
The social distance manipulation follows
our previous work (Story et al., 2020), where
we have described how social discounting
(κÞ for pain depends on social distance. In the
aforementioned study we found that the aver-
age participant showed hyperaltruism (κ > 1)
with respect to the pain of close others; altru-
ism diminished with increasing social distance,
such that κ was below 1 with respect to others
at social distance #50. Therefore, although in
the current study we do not measure social dis-
counting directly, there is strong prior reason
to expect higher altruism towards close others
than towards distant others.
We entertained two possibilities for effects
of social distance on downweighting of others’
dread. Firstly, if downweighting of others’
dread operates akin to an additional social dis-
count factor applied to effects of delay, the
effect would be expected to be greater for
more distant others. This would be consistent
with a postulated Dread Empathy Gap, which
intuitively ought to be more pronounced for
distant others. Similarly, downweighting of
others’ dread might arise due to uncertainty
about others’ degree of dread, which also
might be more pronounced for distant others.
However, an alternative possibility is that
uncertainty about others’ dread is high, even
for close others, and varies little with social dis-
tance. Furthermore, in the face of such uncer-
tainty, increasing others’ pain to avoid delay
could be misconstrued as intentional harm.
Since pain itself is therefore likely a more reli-
able yardstick of suffering than is the wait pre-
ceding pain, focusing on reducing pain
intensity would be a useful heuristic to prevent
inadvertent harm. Such a precautionary
motive ought to reveal itself most prominently
where causing inadvertent harm to others is
most costly, predicting greater downweighting
of dread for close others. In other words, this
possibility suggests that when considering
those we care about, we focus on reducing
their pain directly, rather than relieving their
dread.
Method
Participants and Sample Size
Healthy participants who had worker
accounts on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) were recruited via an advertisement.
MTurk is an online marketplace for work, now
widely used as a method of data collection for
psychology experiments (Mason & Suri, 2012).
Responses on MTurk have been shown to be
reliable (Crump et al., 2013) and replicate
well-established findings in the cognitive psy-
chology literature (Rand, 2012).
In Experiment 1, pairwise comparison
between AUC in self-now-self-later and other-now-
other-later conditions revealed a medium effect:
Cohen’s d = 0.65. We therefore performed a
power calculation for Experiment 2 based on
a paired t-test with a medium effect size
(Cohen’s d= 0.5), which indicated that a sam-
ple size of 32 participants was required to
achieve 80% power. Since responses on
MTurk are likely to be noisier than those
obtained in the laboratory, as a heuristic we
aimed for double this sample size. (We note
that an alternative procedure would have been
to calculate the sample required to detect half
the previous effect size, namely, Cohen’s
d = 0.33, yielding a sample size of 72).
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A total of 70 participants completed the
experiment via MTurk (32 females; mean age
36.8 years, s.d. = 10.5 years; median yearly
income $30,000 USD; 31/70 university edu-
cated). All workers held an MTurk ‘Masters
Qualification’, meaning that they had consis-
tently demonstrated a high degree of success
in performing a wide range of tasks. The task
was expected to take approximately 20 min;
participants took an average of 17 min to com-
plete the task, and all completed the task in
less than 26 min. Participants were compen-
sated $3 USD for their participation, an aver-
age rate of $10.29 per hour. Choices were
administered via the secure online software,
Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com; Provo, UT).
Ethics Statement
All participants gave full informed consent
before taking part in the study. The study pro-
cedures received approval from the UCL
Research Ethics Committee (4418/002). We
report all measures, manipulations, and exclu-
sions in these studies.
Experimental Choices
Participants chose between two different
hypothetical medical treatments, described as
entailing a painful injection into the bone.
The treatments were said to prevent the onset
of dementia later in life, to be completely safe,
free of charge and 100% effective if received
any time in the next 10 years. Participants
were told that the painful procedure would
involve an injection into the bone marrow
causing pain lasting for half an hour. The
intensity of the pain was said to depend on the
identity of a nurse available to perform the
injection, and was described on a 10-point
pain scale. Participants were given no addi-
tional information about why the identity of
the nurse affected the intensity of pain. We
explicitly told participants that neither the
level of pain, nor identity of the nurse, nor the
timing of the appointment would alter the
effectiveness of the treatment. Participants
completed self-now-self-later choices regarding
the timing of the treatment for themselves, as
well as other-now-other-later choices, regarding
the timing of the treatment for another per-
son, either on behalf of either their closest
friend or relative (social distance #1) or on
behalf of a person at social distance #50.
In each case, participants were told the
timing of the appointment, and how painful
the treatment would be on a 10-point scale.
Seventy-two choices were offered between two
possible appointment times. For each choice,
one appointment option was always ‘this week’
(delay 0 weeks), and the other was delayed
4, 17 or 52 weeks. Choice options at each
delay, and calculation of AUC using a log scale
for delay, were identical to those in Experi-
ment 1 (as shown in Table 1).
Results
Self–Other Difference in Dread Depends on Social
Distance
Participants exhibited a pattern consistent
with dread in all three conditions (mean AUC
self-now-self-later = 0.18, 95% CI [0.12 0.24]
mean AUC other-now-other-later #50 = 0.14, 95%
CI [0.09 0.20], mean AUC other-now-other-later
#1 = 0.13, 95% CI [0.08 0.18]). Repeated mea-
sures ANOVA of AUC in the three conditions
revealed a significant effect of condition (F
(1,69) = 3.31, p = .039, partial η2 = 0.072).
Inspection of the data, as shown in Figure 5,
revealed a pattern consistent with diminished
dread for close others. Indeed, pairwise tests
revealed that participants exhibited signifi-
cantly diminished dread in other-now-other-later
#1 choices compared with self-now-self-later
choices (Fig. 5; t(69) = 2.23, p = .029, Cohen’s
d = 0.27), with no significant difference
between other-now-other-later #50 choices and
self-now-self-later choices (Fig. 5; t(69) = 1.53,
p = .136). Consistent with this in repeated
measures ANOVA, there was a significant
effect of the linear contrast AUCself >
AUCother#50 > AUCother#1 (F(1,69) = 4.97,
p = .029, partial η2 = 0.067), supporting more
diminished dread when choosing for close
others than for socially distant others or one-
self. These results support a hypothesis that
when attempting to relieve others’ delayed
pain, people preferentially seek to relieve pain
intensity, rather than dread, putatively to avoid
causing inadvertent harm.
We fitted a Dread Empathy Gap model
jointly to the three conditions, allowing κ to
vary within participant across the two social
conditions while holding constant λ. As shown
in Figure 5 the model provided a good fit to
the data (mean pseudo-R2=0.87). We note
13Altruistic Responses to Pain Underestimate Dread
however that this model has a relatively large
number of free parameters (κ#50,κ#1,K,ρ,α,λ
and the softmax inverse temperature, β). In
particular, Experiment 2 did not require par-
ticipants to trade-off their own pain with that
of others, and so κ#1 and κ#50 are not strictly
defined. Nevertheless, as expected, κ#1
(mean = 1.15) emerged greater than κ#50
(mean = 0.93), implying greater altruism for
close others than for distant others. Further-
more, the model reproduced the rank order-
ing of dread as a function of social distance,
an effect that was driven by differences in κ.
According to the model, in other-now-other-later
choices, κ applies to both immediate and del-
ayed pain options and therefore does not
directly alter dread (relative to self-now-self-later
choices). However, κ does have the effect of
amplifying or diminishing the subjective value
of both choice options, thereby modulating
the effective decision temperature. This inter-
action of κ with decision temperature was suffi-
cient to account for the observed differences
in choice of delayed pain as a function of
social distance. The effect arises since higher κ
amplifies effects of λ; in psychological terms,
greater concern for the pain of close others
amplifies a downweighting of delay. In other
words, greater altruism towards close others applies
preferentially to pain itself rather than to dread.
General Discussion
In this study, across two experiments, we
examined how people attempt to relieve
others’ delayed pain. We predicted people
would choose to expedite pain both for them-
selves or others, even if this entailed increasing
the intensity of the pain. We further hypothe-
sized that the tendency to expedite others’
pain would be less marked than for one’s own
pain, in keeping with a hypothesis of a Dread
Empathy Gap.
Consistent with previous studies (Berns
et al., 2006; Loewenstein, 1987; Story et al.,
2015; Story et al., 2013), subjects chose to
expedite their own pain, with most enduring a
higher intensity pain to avoid waiting. Across
both experiments, participants also sought to
hasten the onset of pain when deciding on
behalf of another person (other-now-other-later
choices), and even increased the intensity of
others’ pain to avoid its delay. As predicted, in
Experiment 1, where the other person was
another experimental participant in an adja-
cent room, participants chose to expedite pain
for others significantly less than for them-
selves. We observed a nonsignificant trend in
the same direction in a comparison
between other-now-self-later and self-now-other-later
conditions, where participants were asked to
trade-off their own delayed pain with the other
participant’s immediate pain or vice versa. In
Experiment 2, with outcomes of a hypothetical
painful medical treatment, at delays of up to
1 year, we found that participants exhibited a
diminished tendency to expedite pain when
choosing on behalf of a close friend or rela-
tive, but not significantly when choosing for a
more distant friend or acquaintance.
In previous work (Story et al., 2020) we have
established that, in similar experimental con-
texts, people are highly altruistic towards the
pain of close others, though altruism steeply
decreases with increasing social distance of the
other. Notably, altruism alone was not suffi-
cient to account for the findings observed in
the current study. Instead we found support
for a model in which altruism applies prefer-
entially to pain itself rather than to dread, that
is, people preferentially seek to relieve the
intensity of pain itself rather than reducing a
dread of pain. We showed that a computa-
tional model implementing this hypothesis
provided a good fit to the behavioral data, and
accounts for the effects of social distance.
Precisely why altruistic responses should
privilege the relief of pain itself over the cost
of waiting remains to be firmly established. At
first glance our finding that downweighting of
dread appears larger for close than for distant
others appears surprising. The finding seems
inconsistent with our original prediction that
downweighting of others’ dread would occur
due to an empathy gap, whereby people have
difficulty predicting the emotional responses
of others in different situations from them-
selves (Lowenstein, 2005; Nordgren
et al., 2011; Read & Van Leeuven, 1998). Such
empathy gaps might be expected to be larger
for more distant others. Similarly, uncertainty
about others’ dread might be expected to be
greater for more distant others than for close
others, thereby driving greater downweighting
of dread for distant others, the reverse of the
pattern seen here.
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However, we cannot reject the possibility
that preference uncertainty lies at the root of
the phenomenon, since uncertainty about
others’ propensity to speed-up pain might well
be very high, even for close others, and vary
little with social distance. Since pain itself is
therefore likely a more reliable yardstick of
suffering than is the wait preceding pain,
focusing on reducing pain intensity would be
a useful heuristic to prevent causing inadver-
tent harm. In psychological terms, the ten-
dency towards such a precautionary motive
ought to reveal itself most prominently where
causing inadvertent harm to others is most
costly. In other words, we hypothesize that the
very fact of caring for someone paradoxically
makes us more likely to underestimate their
dislike of waiting for pain, because we focus
instead on directly reducing their pain. Fur-
ther work is required to explore these beliefs
directly. We also note that Experiment 2 sam-
pled only two points along the continuum of
social distance, for comparison to preferences
for the self. Further investigation of differ-
ences in dread across a social distance contin-
uum (for example, at #100) could contribute
to an improved understanding of the phenom-
ena described here.
That we observed a significant diminution
in dread for socially close but not socially dis-
tant others in hypothetical choices in Experi-
ment 2, and yet a significant diminution in
dread for an anonymous stranger in Experi-
ment 1, might also be seen as surprising. We
propose that concern for others is higher in a
laboratory setting than would be expected for
behavior towards a complete stranger, due in
part to priming an idea that both participants
are ‘in it together’. This idea would be consis-
tent with findings that similar others are
judged as more socially close than dissimilar
others (Liviatan et al., 2008). The trend
towards hyperaltruistic behavior seen in Exper-
iment 1, and (more robustly) in previous
social decision-making studies involving
others’ pain (Batson et al., 1983; Crockett
et al., 2014; Hein et al., 2011) would appear to
support this view. Indeed, levels of charitable
giving seen in economic games in the labora-
tory appear to overestimate the extent of spon-
taneous altruism towards anonymous strangers
in everyday life (Dana et al., 2006;
Engel, 2011; Koch & Normann, 2008;
List, 2007).
We found that models of dread based on
hyperbolic discounting outperformed the
exponential models we tested previously
(Story et al., 2013). Under the best performing
model, preference for sooner pain was
accounted for in terms of waiting cost that
scaled with delay, but not with pain intensity.
This finding diverges from previous models of
dread, which focus on the aversive anticipation
of pain, a quantity that would be expected to
scale with pain intensity. A possible explana-
tion is that a preference for sooner pain repre-
sents a more generic form of impatience than
previously thought; in other words, what we
have referred to as dread could equally repre-
sent a generic cost associated with waiting for
any form of outcome.
A possible explanation for an apparent lack
of influence of the severity of delayed pain on
dread would be that, in Experiment 1, differ-
ent intensities of delayed pain did not evoke
substantially different anticipatory responses.
Possible factors limiting an aversive anticipa-
tion of the pain stimuli used here are that the
stimuli were exceedingly brief (< 1 s), and that
a countdown timer displayed on the screen
reduced participants’ uncertainty regarding
the onset of pain. Consistent with this idea, in
the current study, we did not find a significant
anticipatory skin conductance response in
advance of shock at the group level. Further
work is needed to establish whether dread
depends on pain intensity across a greater
range of aversiveness. Notably, our finding of
diminished dread when choosing for others
does not depend on the precise form of
dread-discounting model, and is also evident
in analysis of raw choice frequencies.
The dread-discounting models studied here
have a larger number of parameters (α,ρ,K
for Hyperbolic Dread) by comparison with
conventional discounting models, which usu-
ally have just one or two parameters. The addi-
tional parameters of the dread-discounting
model are necessary to account for qualita-
tively different patterns of preference for dif-
ferent participants, to either defer pain
(captured by the discounting term) or expe-
dite it (captured by the dread term). However,
we acknowledge that the discounting parame-
ter K is poorly defined for participants who
prefer to expedite pain, and tends to trade-off
against the dread parameters. For the pur-
poses of studying individual differences, more
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reliable estimates can be achieved either by
fitting separate models to sets of participants
with qualitatively different preferences (e.g. a
discounting model for participants who prefer
to defer pain and a dread model for those
who prefer to expedite it), or by using a hier-
archical model-fitting routine to regularize
estimates of any parameters that are poorly-
defined for some participants. Here we adopt
the latter approach.
In previous studies, dread has been evoked
to explain why monetary losses are discounted
at a lower rate than monetary gains, a phe-
nomenon referred to as the sign effect (Estle
et al., 2006; Gonçalves & Silva, 2015; Tanaka
et al., 2014; Yates & Watts, 1975). Most people
still prefer to defer losses, suggesting that
losses incur less dread than is the case for pain
(Harris, 2012; Loewenstein, 1987), however, a
subset of individuals indeed prefer to expedite
losses (Myerson et al., 2017). A key difference
between monetary loss and pain is that, in
experimental contexts, pain is usually tran-
sient. As a result, the negative hedonic effect
of monetary loss can be more temporally
extended. The model of Loewenstein (1987)
also considers dread-discounting for tempo-
rally extended outcomes, showing theoretically
that for more prolonged experiences dis-
counting tends to dominate the effects of
dread. Further work in this area might con-
sider how people discount losses on behalf of
others. The model introduced here suggests
that the influence of delay will be diminished
when choosing on behalf of others. A more
nuanced prediction is that people should move
towards ‘zero time preference’ when choosing
for others. In other words, when choosing on
behalf of others, people who predominantly
discount delayed losses would be expected to
show lower discounting compared to when
choosing for themselves, while people who pre-
dominantly dread delayed losses would show
lower dread. This prediction is also consistent
with a finding of diminished discounting when
people make intertemporal choices for rewards
on behalf of others (Kim et al., 2013).
Experiment 1 used probabilistic painful out-
comes, with a 1/10 chance of being realized.
We note that this form of ‘incentive-compati-
ble’ design, in which selected choices count
for real is standard in studies of reward-guided
choice, albeit with the necessary difference
that, in the current study, painful outcomes
are realized within the experiment, rather
than at the end. This arrangement was neces-
sary to allow for a sufficient number of experi-
mental trials to be administered within a
reasonable timescale. Extensive research has
examined effects of probability discounting,
such that the subjective value of a probabilistic
reward has been shown to decrease hyperboli-
cally with the odds against its being realized
(e.g., Białaszek et al., 2019; Estle et al., 2006;
Jones & Rachlin, 2009). A theoretical consider-
ation therefore is that participants may have
discounted options according to their proba-
bility. Furthermore, for reward, delay dis-
counting is less steep when outcomes are
described in probabilistic terms (Andreoni &
Sprenger, 2012; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995).
Therefore, it is theoretically possible that the
effects seen here could differ in magnitude in
a design in which every painful outcome was
realized.
Against this, it is worth noting that the prob-
abilistic nature of the outcomes was not dis-
played on screen during the presentation of
choice options, and therefore was not likely to
be a salient feature informing participants’
behavior. Furthermore, the probability of a
choice being realized was constant across all
choice options, and served only to ensure that
participants were incentivized to treat all
choices as potentially realizable. Any interac-
tion between probability and delay ought
therefore to have been constant across condi-
tions. To our knowledge, interactions between
probability, delay and social discounting for
painful outcomes have not been explored
experimentally, and remain an interesting
area for future research.
A related concern is that outcomes of
Experiment 2 are hypothetical rather than
real. For reward discounting, hypothetical and
real outcomes have been shown to be gener-
ate comparable choice patterns (Johnson &
Bickel, 2002; Madden et al., 2003). However,
for decisions involving others’ pain, hypotheti-
cal and real choices diverge in some instances,
and engage partly separable neural susbtrates
(FeldmanHall, Dalgleish et al., 2012;
FeldmanHall, Mobbs et al., 2012). In particu-
lar, FeldmanHall, Mobbs et al. (2012) found
that hypothetical moral scenarios devoid of
context or concrete consequences appeared
to maximize adherence to perceived moral
duties, such as not harming others.
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Specifically, in an experiment that required
participants to trade-off keeping money for
themselves against pain for another person,
participants kept significantly more money,
and thereby caused others more pain, in real
scenarios than in contextless hypothetical sce-
narios. In light of these findings, it is possible
that the hypothetical outcomes in Experiment
2 overestimated participants’ generosity
towards distant others. Direct comparison of
the effects reported here under equivalent
conditions with hypothetical and real out-
comes would be required to investigate this
possibility. However, it is unclear how such
effects would bias our key finding of diminished
dread. Furthermore, FeldmanHall, Mobbs
et al. (2012) found that behavior in hypothetical
scenarios enhanced with additional contextual
detail was intermediate between real and
contextless-imaginary scenarios. Similarly, the
naturalistic context used here in Experiment 2 is
likely to lend these choices greater veridicality.
Finally, having control over the timing of
others’ pain finds application in healthcare
decision-making where clinicians or policymakers
control the timing of medical or surgical proce-
dures. Our findings suggest that underestimation
of others’ dread of pain in healthcare decisions
might have an impact on peoples’ wellbeing
across differing scenarios and timescales. We
observe underestimation of dread in Experiment
1 with real painful outcomes over a timescale of
seconds, analogous to minor in-person medical
procedures, such as phlebotomy or vaccinations.
We also observe the effect in Experiment
2, which involves health-related hypothetical
outcomes over a timescale of months, analo-
gous to decisions about the timing of more
substantive medical treatments, such as elec-
tive surgery. Our finding of a greater reduc-
tion in dread for close others in Experiment
2 suggests this effect might be particularly
prominent in real-world scenarios where the
decision maker has a caring relationship with
the recipient.
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